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Abstract—Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a technique
enabling data from several sources to be used in a secure
computation revealing only the result while protecting the orig-
inal data, facilitating shared utilization of data sets gathered
by different entities. The presence of Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) hardware in datacenters can provide accelerated
computing as well as low latency, high bandwidth communication
that bolsters the performance of MPC and lowers the barrier to
using MPC for many applications. In this work, we propose a
Secret Sharing FPGA design based on the protocol described by
Araki et al. [1]. We compare our hardware design to the original
authors’ software implementations of Secret Sharing and to work
accelerating MPC protocols based on Garbled Circuits with
FPGAs. Our conclusion is that Secret Sharing in the datacenter is
competitive and when implemented on FPGA hardware was able
to use at least 10× fewer computer resources than the original
work using CPUs.
Index Terms—Multiparty Computation, Secret Sharing, Secure
Computation, FPGA, Datacenter, Cloud Service
I. INTRODUCTION
Many organizations face the problem of wanting to perform
useful computations when the underlying data is sensitive.
Cryptographically secure multi-party computation (MPC) al-
lows people to outsource encoded versions of their data
to several compute parties, who can then analyze the data
without reading it. As defined in pending legislation within
the United States Senate, “the term ‘secure multi-party com-
putation’ means a computerized system that enables different
participating entities in possession of private sets of data to
link and aggregate their data sets for the exclusive purpose
of performing a finite number of pre-approved computations
without transferring or otherwise revealing any private data to
each other or anyone else” [2].
MPC has been an active area of research for about 40
years [3]–[6], and it has been deployed to protect data in
the healthcare [7], [8], education [9], [10], finance [11]–[13],
and technology [14], [15] sectors. Nevertheless, recent surveys
reveal a few companies with specialized MPC offerings For
adoption of MPC to increase, it is necessary to continue to
improve the performance and ease of use of general-purpose
systems. Existing work has shown that acceleration of general-
purpose MPC can translate into viable systems [16].
The crux of this and related work is whether MPC is
amenable to hardware acceleration. There are two main tech-
niques for achieving MPC: Secret Sharing consumes signif-
icantly lower bandwidth but requires low latency, and Gar-
bled Circuits are compute-bound in any environment with
sufficiently high bandwidth. Between these two options, Gar-
bled Circuits appear more amenable to hardware acceleration,
which is the subject of substantial prior research, especially
with FPGAs [17]–[27]. However, the overall trend of con-
solidating computing into data centers changes this calculus.
Evans et al. note that “[b]andwidth within a data center is
inexpensive” with the caveat that there are security questions
that must be given careful consideration in this context [3].
Our exploration finds a compelling argument for hardware
acceleration of MPC via Secret Sharing: when deployed in a
datacenter, the low latency between accelerators (e.g., within a
node, bump-in-the-wire, etc.) can enable Secret Sharing MPC
to make more effective use of the available bandwidth than
their Garbled Circuit counterparts [28]. We propose FPGAs
as a hardware platform to maximize the performance of MPC
in the datacenter because they provide high bandwidth and
minimize latency by integrating compute and communication.
In this paper, we explore different datacenter models, con-
sider the steps necessary to create a viable MPC cloud service,
examine the trade-off between Garbled Circuits and Secret
Sharing, implement Secret Sharing in hardware, test this
hardware design, and assess its scalability. We conclude by
proposing directions for future work toward a complete MPC
cloud service.
We summarize the contributions in this work:
• We believe we are the first group to report on Secret
Sharing MPC on FPGA hardware. We demonstrate that
given a set of reasonable security assumptions, MPC on
FPGAs in the datacenter is viable for a real service.
• We demonstrate that Secret Sharing outperforms state-of-
the-art methods for implementing MPC in the datacenter.
• Using 5.5% of FPGA fabric in a consumer cloud environ-
ment, we match the throughput of an optimized 20-core
CPU implementation saturating a typical 10Gbps network
connection. This result scales with available bandwidth:
a single FPGA is able to saturate a 200Gbs link with a
throughput of ∼26 million AES operations per second.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Datacenter Model
The primary motivation of this work is to create an effective
cloud datacenter that can offer MPC-as-a-service that is easy to
use and has high performance. Because MPC requires multiple
computing parties for security and low latency networking
for performance, we consider processing hardware owned by
different parties and housed within a single datacenter. This
arrangement permits secure data storage across the computing
parties close to processing locations. Concretely, we imagine a
scenario where a small number of FPGAs are connected over
high-speed interconnects and have the benefit of drawing data
from servers all co-located within the datacenter.
FPGA hardware acceleration has seen increasing adoption
in datacenters. As described in Section II-B, FPGA hardware
properties and co-location yield high throughput for MPC
protocols based on Secret Sharing, which makes the most
effective use of available bandwidth. Maximizing throughput is
a focus for this work as this metric determines how efficiently
multiple client tasks can be completed.
B. MPC Paradigms
MPC protocols support an arbitrary number N of compute
parties and tolerate an arbitrary threshold T of ‘bad’ parties
working together, where this coalition might try to break con-
fidentiality to learn other people’s data or to tamper with the
integrity of the calculation. In this work, we examine a 3-party
protocol tolerating 1 adversarial party who “semi-honestly”
follows the protocol and only tries to break confidentiality.
This matches a scenario in which a small number of FPGAs
owned by different parties are co-located within a datacenter.
General-purpose MPC designs often represent the agreed-
upon computation as an arithmetic or Boolean circuit, and
follow the Garbled Circuit or Secret Sharing approaches.
Garbled Circuits rely on one compute party generating a
(large) encoded version of the entire circuit, which it then
transmits to a second party who can evaluate the encoded
circuit on encoded inputs in order to recover the answer. On
the other hand, Secret Sharing-based MPC systems have the
compute parties evaluate each gate of the circuit in parallel on
their own pieces or shares of the data, with a small amount
of network communication required for each multiplication or
AND gate (none is required for addition or XOR gates).
The computation and communication overhead of MPC
manifests itself differently for Garbled Circuits and Secret
Sharing. Even with optimizations [29]–[33], Garbled Circuits
have a small number of communication rounds but a large
communication size (80-128× the size of the original data),
rendering them beneficial in high-latency scenarios but detri-
mental when processing large datasets. Conversely, Secret
Sharing approaches require a low-latency environment because
they involve many rounds of communication, however they
consume substantially less bandwidth per computational step.
To date, most MPC implementations are in software, and
thus rely on general-purpose processing hardware and com-
modity networking equipment. In this scenario, Secret Sharing
tends to be network latency-bound whereas Garbled Circuits
are often compute-bound. Consequently, most of the prior fo-
cus in hardware acceleration has been directed toward Garbled
Circuits. Our work specifically considers MPC implementa-
tions in the datacenter, where Secret Sharing systems offer
higher maximum throughput and the network latency can be
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Fig. 1: Initial Secret Sharing
low enough to realize meaningful performance benefits by
optimizing the computation with FPGAs.
C. Selected MPC Protocol
Within the category of MPC protocols based on Secret
Sharing, we selected a protocol by Araki et al. [1], [34] for
FPGA acceleration due to its simplicity and its impressive
performance in software. The Araki et al. protocol employs
exactly 3 parties, and it tolerates 1 adversarial party that
is presumed to follow the protocol. Also, communication
occurs in a ring topology, where each party only needs to
communicate with 1 of the other 2 parties.
The workflow involves 3 distinct steps. First, data holders
split their data into shares held by the 3 compute parties.
Then, the parties iteratively compute over these shares without
revealing any secrets. Finally, the compute parties reveal their
shares to the output party who can reconstruct the final answer.
In the share phase, anyone holding a secret value v ∈ {0, 1}
can split this secret among the 3 compute parties as follows.
• The data holder selects x1, x2, x3 uniformly from {0, 1}
subject to the constraint that x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 = 0.
• The data holder sends (xi, ai) to each compute party,
where ai = xi−1 ⊕ v is a one-time pad of the secret.
The one-time pad hides the secret value v from any single
party Pi. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
In the compute phase, the parties work together to com-
pute shares of the result of each XOR or AND gate in a
privacy-preserving manner. It is easiest to imagine fan-in 2
operations proceeding sequentially with inputs (xi, ai) and
(yi, bi), though we stress that this process is embarrassingly
parallel.
• XOR operation: Each share of the XOR of the two values
simply equals the XOR of the two input shares (see
Figure 2) because a one-time pad is homomorphic under
the ⊕ operation. The parties do not need to communicate.
• AND operation: Calculating shares of the result of an
AND gate is more complex; it requires each compute
party to compute a non-trivial amount of Boolean logic
Start XOR Computation
XiAi YiBi
YiXi Ai Bi
XOR XOR
Zi Ci
ZiCi
Finish XOR Computation
Fig. 2: Party i’s contribution toward computing an XOR gate
and transmit one bit of information to one other compute
party. First, the parties produce correlated random values
α1, α2, and α3 that XOR to 0 but are independent of any
secret values; if the parties distribute short keys before
the computation, they can generate correlated randomness
quickly using a PRF such as AES (Figure 3a). Second,
each compute party follows the circuit shown in Figure
3b that consumes the correlated randomness generated
above; Araki et al. show that the resulting values Ri have
the property that R1 ⊕R2 ⊕ R3 equals the result of the
AND gate. Finally, each party Pi transmits Ri to another
party Pi+1, and then re-builds shares of the result in our
desired format {(zi, ci)} (Figure 3c).
In the reconstruction phase, we presume that the compute
parties have calculated shares {(x′
i
, a′
i
)} corresponding to the
output value v′. Then, the parties can reconstruct v′ by reveal-
ing their shares and computing
⊕3
i=1
a′
i
=
⊕3
i=1
(x′
i
⊕v) = v.
There exist extensions of the Araki et al. protocol that
permit additional parties or provide stronger security against
a malicious attacker [35]–[37]. An FPGA implementation of
this protocol provides an ideal starting point from which to
explore the benefits of acceleration for related schemes with
different features, and the possibility of dynamically switching
between them to improve performance further [38], [39].
D. FPGA Models
Several FPGA deployment models are possible with varying
trade-offs. Options from lowest to highest performance in-
clude: (1) co-processor, (2) bump-in-the-wire, (3) single-node
cluster, (4) enclave/silo on FPGA. The enclave/silo approach
where one FPGA is allocated into several regions for different
parties is appealing from a performance perspective as it would
enable near zero latency and near infinite bandwidth. Such
an arrangement does raise many difficult questions about the
isolation of the parties which go beyond the scope of the
current work. Within this hierarchy, the Amazon AWS F1
instances we consider fall into the single-node cluster category.
Amazon describes two different inter-board communication
approaches.The F1.4xlarge, and F1.16xlarge instances should
have a 400Gbps serial ring link but support is only planned in
a future release. Communication between FPGAs is possible
TABLE I: Araki et al. Result Analysis
Araki et al. Results Verification
Cores AES/sec Gbps/serv. Gbps/serv.
w/over.
Error
1 100103 ± 1632 0.572 0.559 2.19%
5 530408 ± 7219 2.99 2.96 0.85%
10 975237 ± 3049 5.47 5.45 0.35%
16 1242310 ± 4154 6.95 6.94 0.10%
20 1324117 ± 3721 7.38 7.40 0.28%
at 12Gbps over PCIe. In testing the proposed Secret Sharing
block, an AWS F1.2xlarge instance was used rather than the
the 4x or 16x as initial testing only required a single FPGA.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Analysis of Original Implementation
Obtaining the secure operation metrics enables comparison
of the FPGA design to the original results. Inspection of
the original results of this Secret Sharing implementation
for secure AES [35] reveals the use of the Bristol Fashion
Key Expanded AES [40] requiring 5440 secure AND oper-
ations. The test described by Araki et al. is embarrassingly
parallel, simultaneously running 12800 independent secure
AES computations per core in each node. The total AES
operations performed can be used to verify the number of bits
communicated. Runtime is obtained from the AES/sec rate
and total number of AES operations. Including a reasonable
overhead for TCP/IP of 2.74% [41] the verified network rates
closely match the reported results with less than 2.5% error
(Table I). The FPGA design can be reasonably compared to
this system using the 5440 AND/AES conversion.
B. FPGA Implementation
Here we cover some FPGA implementation details for the
chosen MPC protocol. Two OpenCores projects were used, one
for AES [42] and one for a RNG [43] for faster development.
Amazon Web Services (AWS) reference designs [44] and
hardware were used for testing the preliminary scheme.
At startup, each party generates a random key for the PRF
and shares it with one other party. Currently, each party uses
one RNG module [43] to generate the key. The security of
this RNG block was not examined; a deployed version might
use a physically unclonable function (PUF) or other secure
hardware RNG.
Each party contains one PRF instance that is alternately
evaluated in counter mode, using each of the two keys the
party holds and the same counter. Each output pair is then
XORed to produce a new correlated random number. As the
keys are only set at startup, the 21 clock cycle pipeline delay
for the selected PRF was only experienced at initialization.
The MPC AND module itself consists of a few bitwise
operations that produce the intermediate Ri values (Figure 3b).
Most latency occurs in the transmission of the Ri values, since
the final step (Figure 3c) cannot begin without those values.
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Fig. 3: Party i’s contribution toward computing an AND gate
C. Analysis of FPGA Implementation
The MPC AND hardware operation must be fed data and
triggered by external logic. The first implementation uses an
Arria 10 and NIOS II softcore. A NIOS custom instruction
was used to load data and start the operation. The custom
instruction enables simple software control of the hardware
MPC AND operation. The second implementation uses Ama-
zon Web Service (AWS) FPGAs available through its Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). Specifically, Xilinx Virtex
UltraScale+ VU9P FPGAs are accessible via a virtual machine
in EC2 F1 instances. Amazon includes a hardware shell for
software/hardware co-design between the node CPU (Intel
Xeon E5-2686 v4) and FPGA. Software to control the FPGA
uses provided DMA functions and PCIe function templates.
This furnishes the mechanism for loading data, controlling
operations, and retrieving results.
The PCIe packets are translated through the Amazon shell
and utilize multiple AXI bus configurations to send and receive
data with the software system. We use the general purpose
AXI bus supporting a 512 bit data packet to provide a single
message containing two secret share vectors (4×128-bits) prior
to starting the hardware operations. The HDL design takes
each AXI bus message, parses the information, and relays data
to the desired AND module.
D. Design Improvements and Additions
Based on the minimal data dependencies and flow in Figure
3, in principle a fully pipelined MPC AND module (128
Boolean MPC ANDs) can execute one AND operation per
clock cycle. Such a design would saturate a 10Gbps network
connection when operated at 78.13 MHz. Operating at the
higher frequencies used commonly by FPGAs would require
higher bandwidth. For example, at 200 MHz, a single MPC
module of this type saturates a 25.6Gbps link.
IV. RESULTS
A. Testing and Data
The MPC AND module on FPGA was assessed in regards
to its resource utilization with varying levels of duplication
and based on the latency of evaluation.
Initial testing targeted Intel FPGAs, such as the Arria 10,
with the the NIOS II softcore executing test software to load
data and trigger the MPC AND hardware. The limitations of
the Avalon Bus width and the latency a simple softcore design
imposes encouraged us to consider other options. Note, there
are still circumstances where a softcore is viable such as in a
design using local storage and other techniques to overcome
the limits of loading individual data and running an operation
in sequence. Regardless, with the single AND design synthe-
sized in Quartus, targeting an Arria 10 (10AX115S2F45I1SG)
provided initial insights. The most constrained resource for
a single AND was the 704.5Kb of M20K block memory
consumed post-synthesis, making is possible to estimate the
utilization to be ∼1.32% based on the total 53.260Mb of
M20K available on the Arria 10. With perfect utilization this
would permit ∼76 instances. More realistically perhaps 70%
of the fabric might be used allowing for ∼54 instances of
the MPC AND. As implemented, the MPC AND requires 6
clock cycles between operation which means that 48 MPC
AND instances makes it possible for 8 operations to occur
each cycle. Even with only 8 AND operations per cycle at
200Mhz the design is able to saturate ∼205Gbps, far more
than the 10Gbps link in the original paper.
With these synthesis results from Quartus but seeking to
avoid the limitations of the NIOS II and to find a more
fitting cloud target we looked to Amazon Web Services (AWS).
While the Amazon AWS F1 instances do not currently offer
the promised high-speed serial ring [44], targeting the boards
available provides hardware utilization insights, and leaves the
possibility of more easily using higher speed communication
when support materializes. Furthermore, the PCIe option,
while lower performance, remains available for future tests.
For a single 1-party block post-routing, the Virtex Ultra-
scale+ utilizes ∼3.20% of its resources. In order to verify that
all three parties functioned together properly, a 3×party design
with 1 AND per party was made to target a single FPGA. This
made it possible to pass data and trigger operations without
having to immediately spend the development time to bring-
up the AXI4-Stream between FPGAs over PCIe. Furthermore,
TABLE II: AWS Implementation Result Analysis
AND Cores Bits Gbps AES (millions op.)/sec
1 128 2.67 0.490
3 384 8.00 1.47
12 1536 32.0 5.89
24 3072 64.0 11.8
48 6144 128 23.5
60 7680 160 29.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
AND Cores
P
er
ce
n
t
U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
Fig. 4: AWS FPGA fabric total utilization
since each 1 party block contains more control logic than
just a single MPC AND it serves as an adequate conservative
estimate of how many AND blocks might fit on one FPGA.
Continuing this line of testing led to duplicating groups of the
3×party block the results of which are summarized in Table
II. The number of AND modules are used to determine the
number of bits per clock cycle that are processed. The F1
instance was clocked at 125Mhz producing the listed Gbps
results. The equivalent number of AES/sec was determined
by dividing by the 5440 AND/AES used in Araki et al. A
plot of the FPGA utilization in Figure 4 shows a fairly linear
relationship between number of AND modules and utilization.
B. Analysis
The tests performed with different quantities of MPC AND
blocks on Amazon AWS provide sufficient data points to
establish that Secret Sharing MPC can be competitive when
implemented on FPGA hardware in the datacenter. The fabric
utilization in the design scales relatively linearly with increases
in the quantity of AND cores.
The original work utilized a software implementation of
the protocol executed on general purpose processors [1], [34].
Specifically, each party used varying numbers of cores from
one or two Xeon processors. The authors were able to nearly
saturate their 10Gbps link (7.38Gbps) between parties when
using all cores in each node. This required about 50% of the
processor’s time. While the authors were limited by multiple
cores causing queuing congestion at the Network Interface
Card (NIC) the use of a CPU appears to have more limited
scaling potential. Using the reported number of AES/sec and
network communication for 1 core, scaling from 73.3% CPU
usage to 100% would appear to show 1 core being capable
of at most ∼130 thousand AES/sec, saturating a ∼0.780Gbps
connection. Multiplying for 20 cores that would amount to a
peak of ∼2.7 million AES/sec and ∼15.6Gbps.
In comparison, the FPGA AND block we tested for per-
forming Secret Sharing only requires 3 AND cores per party to
exceed the 7.38Gbps reached with 20 CPU cores, instead being
capable of 8.00Gbps. This uses ∼5% of the fabric available on
the FPGA targeted, a 10× improvement vs the CPU utilization.
Attempting to fully employ the available fabric it is possible
to implement 60 AND cores which would permit saturation
of 160Gbps links while performing 29.4 million AES/sec.
These results demonstrate preferable scaling properties sup-
porting the selection of FPGAs for acceleration. Based on the
results, targeting the anticipated 200Gbps links in the Amazon
F1 would require less than 25% fabric utilization to reach full
saturation if just the pipeline improvement is made. With a
frequency improvement, even less fabric would be required.
The remaining available fabric is beneficial as it allows for
work distribution and additional secure computations.
V. RELATED WORK
There exists earlier research exploring hardware accelerated
MPC, but the efforts have focused on Garbled Circuits rather
than Secret Sharing. The hardware considered has included
GPUs [19], [45]–[47]; most efforts, however, employ FPGAs.
The earliest of these efforts dates to 2010 [17], [18], with more
work recently [23]–[25], and some considering Amazon AWS
[25], [27]. Other work explored garbling entire processors [20],
[22] and specialized problem acceleration [21].
The studies from researchers at Northeastern University
are most relevant here. Their overlay architecture [24] and
identification of datacenters as an ideal place to perform such
computations [26] matches our decisions. With respect to
overlays, they implement blocks to accelerate the garbling of
AND and XOR operations and that do not require the FPGA
image to be recreated and programmed. Instead data is passed
to these processing elements which is much more efficient. We
follow a similar scheme with Secret Sharing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we describe one approach to implementing the
underlying MPC AND operation described by Araki et al. [35]
in hardware. We demonstrate the viability of Secret Sharing
MPC in a low latency environment and test the design on an
FPGA in the cloud highlighting greater potential scalability
of the design compared to alternatives. With these insights,
we plan to pursue improvements to this design to increase
the performance further and to implement the higher level
controls necessary to use our Secret Sharing building block
in a complete MPC cloud service.
Some specific future work includes HDL implementation
optimizations while maintaining the same scheme. FPGA to
FPGA communication will be evaluated. Additional research
directions include different viable MPC security models and
hardware security considerations on FPGAs.
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